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brief in brief
• Credit card minimum payments can act
as an “anchor” that causes consumers to
pay less of their debt than they otherwise
would, leading to higher balances and
interest costs, lower credit card scores,
increased bankruptcy risks, and in the
aggregate, suboptimally high levels of

In their 2008 book Nudge, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein lay
out a framework for “libertarian paternalism,” a policy approach
that seeks to improve consumers’ decisions without restricting
their freedom to choose.
Smart choice architectures have been shown
to yield remarkable improvements in retirement savings, organ donation, and health
and environmental decisions. But nudges
don’t always work, and sometimes wellintended policies can have perverse effects.
Our recent research uncovers evidence of
perverse nudges in the context of consumer
credit cards.1
With about $700 billion in total
outstanding balances and 400 million
open accounts, credit cards are the fourth
largest source of household borrowing in
the United States after mortgages, student
loans, and auto loans.2 In the aftermath of
the financial crisis, the industry underwent
the most expansive regulatory change in its
history with the Credit Card Accountability

Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009
(“CARD Act”). And in 2011, the industry
received a new regulator with the creation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) following the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Financial Protection Act
of 2010. But despite the prevalence of credit
card debt and recent regulatory attention,
there is surprisingly little systematic evidence about how consumers choose to pay
down their credit card debt and what factors
promote versus hinder debt reduction.
Minimum payments are present on all
monthly credit card statements, and represent the minimum amount a consumer must
pay in order to stay current on her account
and avoid late fees and other penalties. The
median minimum payment is 3 percent of a

debt in the macro-economy.
• Policy “nudges,” which aim to increase
the monthly amount that individuals pay
on their credit card debt, have had mixed
results.
• While raising required minimum payment
levels encouraged consumers with low
credit card balances to pay a larger fraction of their debt, it also nudged some
high-balance borrowers to pay less than
they previously did.
• Similarly, new disclosure requirements,
including late payment and minimum payment warnings, in some cases caused
borrowers who had been paying their
monthly balances in full, to pay less.
• While policy nudges can work, policymakers must take into account their potentially
disparate impacts in order to achieve the
results they are seeking.

Figure 1:
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consumer’s total balance. Despite a median
APR of 17 percent, one third of credit card
accounts are regularly paid with just the
minimum amount, and minimum payers
carry typical balances of nearly $3000. Over
five years, a minimum payer with a typical
balance and purchases would see her balance
more than triple and pay over $2300 in
interest charges.3
Previous research suggests that consumer impatience may contribute to high
levels of credit card borrowing,4 and that
high levels of household leverage are associated with the more severe impacts of the
Great Recession.5 Experimental research
also suggests that minimum payments may
act as an “anchor” that causes consumers to
pay less of their debt than they otherwise
would in the absence of the suggested payment amount. If anchoring is an important
factor in practice, it could cause individual
consumers to carry too much debt and
pay too much in interest costs given their
economic circumstances, leading to lower
credit scores and increased bankruptcy risk.6
In the aggregate, anchoring could also cause
the level of debt in the macro-economy to
be suboptimally high.
Amid growing concern about America’s
national credit card bill, which peaked at
1
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J. Keys and Jialan Wang: “Perverse Nudges: Minimum
Payments and Debt Paydown” (2014).
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Quarterly Report on
Household Debt and Credit,” February 2014.
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Author’s calculations based on the sample from Keys and
Wang (2014).

nearly $900 billion in 2008, policy changes
implemented by the CARD Act and by
individual issuers have sought to increase
consumer payments. But are they effective?
What factors contribute to why so many
consumers pay only the minimum payment,
and what can be done to help consumers
reduce their debt burdens? In this issue
brief, we describe the details of our research
on the patterns of consumer credit card payments and the impacts of policy changes on
payment behavior.

the behavioral
economics of Anchoring
In their landmark study, Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman proposed that “anchoring” can cause an individual’s decisions to be
significantly influenced by irrelevant starting
values.7 In their original experiment and
subsequent studies, subjects latch onto an
initial uninformative value (such as the last
four digits of their phone number or social
security number) as a decision-making
heuristic. As a result, experimenters find
that subjects’ responses to general knowledge questions such as the percentage of
African countries in the United Nations are
significantly biased in the direction of that

How do Consumers Repay
Credit Card Debt?
Using a new dataset from the CFPB covering a large share of credit card accounts in
the United States, we find evidence that
minimum payments play a significant role
in consumer debt payments.8 To understand
consumer payment behavior, we classified
accounts based on whether the account
holders consistently paid in full or paid the
minimum at least 50 percent of the time.
As shown in Figure 1, consumers exhibit
consistent patterns when paying down a
given credit card account. About one third
of account holders are “full payers,” and they
pay their balances in full 90 percent of the
time.9 For full payers, credit cards are used
more as a convenience vehicle than a credit
product.10 Another third are “minimum
payers,” and pay close to the minimum 77
percent of the time. One third of these
minimum payers pay exactly the minimum
payment, and the remainder pays within
$50 of the minimum.11 The final group of
“mixed payers” variably pays a combination of minimum, full, and intermediate
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Marketing Research 48.SPL (2011): S60-S77. Neil Stew-
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Our data come from the CFPB credit card database
(CCDB), which contains credit card accounts from large

Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, “Household Leverage and the
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U.S. credit card issuers, covering a large fraction of total

Recession of 2007–09,” IMF Economic Review 58.1
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outstanding balances in the market between 2008 and

(2010): 74-117.
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initial, irrelevant starting value.
In the context of credit cards, the
minimum payment may be a particularly
potent anchor because failing to pay at
least that amount may trigger a late fee and
penalty interest rate. Thus, a borrower may
perceive being in good standing with the
lender—and on track for future financial
well-being—as long as she pays at least that
amount. Along with the full balance, the
minimum payment is the most prominent
payment option shown on monthly statements. The contrast between the full balance, which is typically thousands of dollars,
and the minimum, which is often as low as
$15 or $20, can make the minimum seem
like an attractive option for cash-strapped
consumers. All of these factors could make
the minimum payment an especially salient
and influential anchor for consumer choices.
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Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under

2012. The statistics presented in this brief are derived
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supervisory information, and the statistics presented in

amounts, and constitutes 35 percent of
credit card accounts.
Despite the mix of payment patterns,
the vast majority of payments consist of
either the full balance or an amount close
to the minimum. As shown in Figure 2, all
three groups display strongly bimodal payment patterns. Even mixed payers typically
pay close to the minimum, which is generally less than 10 percent of the balance.
Strikingly, fewer than 10 percent of all payments fall between 20 and 99 percent of the
balance. Even high-income borrowers do
not always pay off their credit card balances
in full, choosing instead to revolve debt at
substantial annual interest rates.12
Low repayments contribute to consumers carrying significant levels of debt
compared to their income. The median
ratio of total balance to monthly income
is 64 percent for minimum payers and 42
percent for mixed payers.13 Since minimum
payments and monthly interest charges are
only a small fraction of the total balance,
most households can afford the costs of
debt servicing. But as the calculation above
shows, paying only the minimum while
continuing to finance purchases leads to
growing debt balances that can become
difficult to repay in the long run. The one
percent of U.S. households that file for
bankruptcy each year typically have tens of
thousands in credit card debt accumulated
through a combination of high purchases
and low payments.
Standard economic models would suggest that borrowers who accumulate large
debt balances would choose to gradually
pay down their debt over time as a share of
their income, rather than paying only the
minimum for a period of time and then
paying off the entire balance as a lump
sum.14 The bimodal pattern is consistent
with borrowers anchoring on the minimum
payment when faced with a large credit card
bill, so that consumers who would otherwise have paid an intermediate proportion,
such as 30 percent or 50 percent of their

9
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balance, instead choose lower amounts close
to the minimum.15

average effect. As shown in the remaining
columns, this effect is mechanically driven
by minimum payers who move to the new,
higher minimum amounts to avoid late fees.
More surprisingly, we find that consumers with balances over $3000 reduced the
average fraction of the balance they paid
by roughly 2 percent. For this latter group,
the change in the minimum represented
a negligible fraction of their balances, and
they reacted in the opposite direction of the
policy change. Furthermore, the response
of these high-balance accounts is entirely

What Happens When
Issuers Raise the
Required Minimum
Payment?
The first set of policies we examine is a
series of changes in issuers’ minimum
payment formulas. In the time period we
examine between 2008 and 2012, all of
the changes in issuer formulas resulted
Figure 2:
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in increases in the required minimums.
For affected issuers, minimum payments
increased by an average of $18, or about 5
percent of the balance, for account months
with positive balances.
We find that raising the required
minimum payments had no net impact on
overall consumer payments, resulting from
a combination of two offsetting effects.
The policy changes had very different
impacts for borrowers with different balance
amounts. As shown in Figure 3, raising the
minimum payment increased the average
fraction of the balance paid by 1 percent for
accounts with less than $1000 outstanding. The leftmost set of columns shows this

driven by borrowers shifting from paying
off their cards in full to paying only the
minimum.16 Our results suggest that the
new, higher minimum payments anchored
low-balance consumers at a slightly higher
default payment amount, but in the process
nudged some high-balance borrowers in the
wrong direction toward lower payments.

Did the CARD Act Help
Consumers Pay Down
Debt?
In addition to looking at changes in credit
card issuers’ minimum payment formulas,
our research examines changes initiated

this brief are aggregated to maintain the confidentiality of

and often also receive rewards and other benefits. Thus,

other round increments, suggesting that they may use

the underlying data.

credit card issuers often make negative profits on full

rounding heuristics as a budgeting mechanism or a

These consumers are often termed “transactors” in the

payers. See Sumit Agarwal, et al., “Regulating Consumer

way to increase their debt payments above the required

credit card industry. Minimum payers and mixed payers

Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards,” NBER

minimum.

individual accounts, and cannot link multiple accounts

are often jointly termed “revolvers” in industry parlance.

Working Paper. No.19484 (2013).

Forty percent of payments made by borrowers reporting

issued to the same consumer. Since most consumers

Consumers who routinely pay their balances in full often
receive the benefits of convenience with no annual fee,
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individual annual income reported by the borrower at the
time of their credit card application.
13

In our current analysis, we are only able to observe

Rounding behavior is very prevalent in credit card pay-

more than $200,000 per year in income are less than

with at least one credit card have multiple accounts, debt

ments. Borrowers often pay in $50, $100, $1000, and

10 percent of the balance. Our measure of income is

levels at the individual level are likely to be at least double

by the CARD Act of 2009. The CARD
Act included a broad range of provisions
designed to make credit card pricing fairer
and more transparent to consumers, including limitations on interest rate changes, fee
restrictions for late payments and overlimit
transactions, and changes in billing and
payment allocation practices. One study
shows that these provisions have saved U.S.
consumers $12.6 billion per year, and the
2013 CARD Act Report also estimates a
decline in the total cost of credit charged to
consumers.17
In addition to directly changing the way
credit card fees are assessed, the CARD Act
also mandated four distinct new disclosure
requirements to help consumers better
understand the impacts of their payment
choices on the costs of borrowing. The
CARD Act disclosures comprise the second
set of policies we look at in our study of
credit card payments.
The four disclosures took effect in
February of 2010. A late payment warning was required on all statements, such
as: “Late Payment Warning: If we do not
receive your minimum payment by the date
listed above, you may have to pay a $35 late
fee and your APRs may be increased up to
the Penalty APR of 28.99 percent.” Most
statements were also required to include a
general minimum payment warning, stating: “Minimum Payment Warning: If you
make more than the minimum payment
each period, you will pay less in interest and
pay off your balance sooner.” Instead of this
standard minimum payment warning, consumers whose stated minimum payments
did not amortize their balance received a
more drastic warning: “Minimum Payment Warning: Even if you make no more
charges using this card, if you make only the
minimum payment each month we estimate
you will never pay off the balance shown on
this statement because your payment will be
less than the interest charged each month.”
Finally, the majority of statements also were
required to include a comparison between
14

the payment duration and interest costs of
paying only the minimum versus paying
an amount that would amortize the loan
amount, without additional purchases, in
three years. An example of this disclosure is
Figure 3:

that was already present in or could be calculated from credit card contracts, monthly
statements, and pre-existing disclosures
mandated by the Federal Truth in Lending
Act (TILA). Thus, their impacts represent
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example of three-year calculation disclosure mandated by the card act

If you make no	You will pay off the	And you will end up
additional charges
balance shown on
paying an estimated
using this card and
this statement in
total of...
each month you pay...
about...

Only the minimum

11 Years

$4,745

$103

3 Years

$3,712
(Savings = $1,033)

Source: Federal Reserve Board: http://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerinfo/wyntk_creditcardrules.htm.

shown in Figure 4.
Since different combinations of
disclosures were shown to different sets of
consumers based on specific eligibility rules,
we were able to disentangle their individual
effects. In contrast to the minimum formula
changes discussed above, the disclosures did
not change the economic incentives around
credit card payments. Instead, the new
disclosures simply presented information

a distinct test of the potential anchoring
effects of minimum payments and of consumer understanding.
We find that overall, the disclosures
increased payments by $19 per accountmonth, resulting from consumers changing their payment behavior in at least 2-4
percent of accounts per month. The results
confirm that purely informational nudges
have impacts on consumer choices.18 The

those that we report.

same pattern remains even after excluding those with

importance of credit score and consistency of payment

the impacts of the minimum payment changes. See Keys

However, the bimodal pattern we observe could result

promotional offers.

patterns for a given consumer over time provides further

and Wang (2014) for more details.

We also find that the most significant correlate of pay-

evidence that behavioral factors may drive payment

17

Agarwal, et al. (2014).

with different interest rates, and we will explore this pos-

ment behavior is a consumer’s credit score, which a

choices.

18

According to the CARD Act Study (2014), between

sibility in future work. The bimodal pattern could also be

measure of past payment behavior.   While economic

rationalized if consumers pay the minimum because of
0% APR promotional offers. However, we find that the

from consumers paying down multiple cards at a time

15

16

The results described in this paragraph are based on

25-38 percent of consumers make credit card payment

fundamentals such as income and interest rate are

regression analysis that controls for characteristics of

online. The majority of these consumers do not access

not strongly correlated with payment behavior, the

cards, issuers, consumers, and account usage to isolate

their electronic statements before making payments, and

three different combinations of disclosures
that consumers received had very different
impacts. Accounts receiving the nonamortization warning and 3-year calculation
saw payments increase by $24 per month,
and had a small but insignificant increase in
the average fraction paid. In contrast, those
receiving the minimum payment warning
and 3-year payment calculation increased
payments by only $4 per month.
In the absence of a strongly-worded
warning against non-amortizing payments,
the 3-year payment calculation amount
appeared to cause borrowers who were
paying in full to pay less, possibly as a result
of a new anchoring effect. In addition, the
3-year calculation slightly raised the payments of those who were previously paying
low amounts and moved them towards the
higher anchor. Because the perverse nudge
effect dominates, accounts receiving the
3-year calculation and standard minimum
payment warning saw a 0.6 percent overall
reduction in the fraction of balances paid
and a 1.4 percent decline in the accountmonths paid in full.

Policy Implications
Our work is part of a growing body of
research documenting the mixed consequences of nudges in a diverse set of policy
domains. In a well-known example, late
pickups by parents actually increased at an
Israeli preschool after fines were imposed.19
Automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans is one
of the most successful examples of nudges at
work. Nonetheless, while automatic enrollment helps most consumers save more, it
may decrease savings among some consumers who would have enrolled on their own.20
Research has also found that “break-even”

20

“Amid growing concern about
America’s national credit card
bill, which peaked at nearly
$900 billion in 2008, policy
changes have sought to increase
consumer payments. But are
they effective?”

low-balance accounts paying the minimum.
But the changes also nudged high-balance
consumers in the wrong direction, decreasing the fraction of accounts paid in full.
A disclosure mandated by the CARD Act
resulted in similar offsetting effects for
different groups of accounts. Although the
CARD Act had positive overall impacts on
consumers, the payment amount suggested
on the three-year payment amount disclosure may have been too low to effectively
increase consumer payments.
Our results suggest that in order to
be effective, future credit card nudges
should encourage payment amounts high
enough such that any offsetting effects lead
to greater payments overall. Our current

research shows that suggested payment
amounts should be greater than the $20
average minimum payment increases and
the 3-year suggested payment amounts in
the policies we studied. Furthermore, since
increasing required minimums forces some
consumers to become delinquent and suffer late fees and potential default, making
the suggested payment amount an option
rather than a requirement can help preserve
flexibility while encouraging repayment.
In future work, we hope to evaluate the
impact of higher repayment options through
randomized control trials. While our current
work only explores the impacts of low suggested payment amounts that we find to be
ineffective, the results of these future trials
could yield evidence of successful payment
disclosures.
Our results also offer broader lessons
for policymakers. One lesson is that purely
informational nudges do work, consistent
with prior research. Of equal importance,
our results emphasize that changes in choice
architecture affect not only the intended
recipients of a nudge, but everyone who is
subject to the change. A beneficial choice
for one consumer may be detrimental for
another, depending on what their choices
would have been in the absence of the
nudge. These disparate impacts should be
taken into account when weighing the overall welfare implications of any policy change.
The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, its
director, or its staff.

therefore do not see the disclosures. Thus, our results
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saw the disclosures before choosing their payments.
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framing may lead to early claiming of
Social Security benefits,21 that peer-based
nudges decrease energy consumption among
liberal households, but increase consumption among conservatives,22 and that calorie
information may cause dieters to eat more.23
Similarly, we find that introducing
higher suggested payment amounts leads
to two countervailing effects on consumer
credit card payments. Issuers that raised
the required minimum payment saw small
increases in payment amounts among
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